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Abstract
Despite the persistent increase in life expectancy, combined with an increasing penalty for ear-
lier benet take-up under the Old Age Benets Program of Social Security, people continue
to claim benets before the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) in record numbers. Furthermore,
almost 60% of Americans claim at the earliest possible age. We solve and simulate a realis-
tic, and empirically based dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply and benet claiming, that
accounts for the rich set of incentives affecting Older Americans. We model, among other
sources of uncertainty, the uncertainty surrounding future benet amounts, which can be ratio-
nalized by the perception of the need for reforms to the system. Using aggregate and individual
level information on expected benet cuts and probabilities of realizing them, this framework
is one of the rst to explain the large proportion of individuals claiming benets early. More-
over, our model is the rst to predict, consistent with the data, that even if the penalties for
claiming benets early increase (like with the ongoing increases in the NRA) the percentage
of individuals claiming early might not necessarily decline.
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Every American worker receives an annual Social Security Statement in which the government
explicitly states that unless reforms are undertaken there will not be enough funds to pay benets
at the level at which they have been promised.1 The need for reforms to Social Security does
not seem to come as a surprise for the average American. In fact, as reported for example in
several waves of the Health and Retirement Study, individuals believe that there is a 60% chance
that in the next 10 years Social Security benets will be reduced. Given that the Social Security
Administration itself has decided to put the message in black and white for several years now,
through the statements and in several reports that quantify the painful consequences of the lack of
any kind of reform, makes the need of understanding the consequences of this reform uncertainty
the more pressing. Researchers, however, have rarely modeled the uncertainty over Social Security
reform and benet levels, and little is know about how it affects the benet claiming and retirement
behavior of current retirees.
Public pensions are a major income source for older Americans, and under the Old Age and
Survivor Insurance (OASI) system, the Social Security Administrationpaid benets during 2006to
almost 41 million individuals who received about $449.2 billion in benets. Given its importance
is not surprising that the discussion over the need of reforms to the system have gone on for a long
time. Since the 1970s reforming Social Security has been a priority among economic researchers
and policy makers. In fact, the 1983 Amendments where meant to solve the nancial crisis that
1 The statements make clear that by the time the Social Security Trust Fund is exhausted there will only be money
to pay about 74% of the scheduled benets. Similar statements can be found on the website of the Social Security
Administration (http://www.ssa.gov). Even inuential independent policy makers like former chairman of the
Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan in front of the Committee of the Budget of the U.S. House of Representatives stated
that Under current law, and even with the so-called Normal Retirement Age (NRA) for Social Security slated to move
up to 67 over the next two decades, the ratio of the number of years that the typical worker will spend in retirement to
the number of years he or she works will rise in the long term. A critical step forward would be to adjust the system
so that this ratio stabilizes.
1Social Security was headed for.2 Within a decade of the passing of that legislation, it became
clear that further reforms will be necessary to maintain the long-run balance of the system, given
the evolution of the trust fund, and the trends in claiming behavior and labor supply of older
Americans. Policy evaluation researchers failed to accurately predict the responses to this increase
in the retirement age, casting doubt on the usefulness of the models that the analyses were based
on. Specically, ambiguous theoretical responses to such incentives were not properly analyzed,
and what might have been considered large nominal cuts to benets at the time were in fact much
smaller reductions in real terms, especially given the large delays embedded in the implementation
of the legislation.
The large retirement literature that developed during the 1980s and 1990s focused on explain-
ing the connection between retirement incentives and retirement behavior.3 It concluded, quite
convincingly, that the retirement peaks at age 62 and age 65 could be explained if the full set of
incentives were included in the model. However, in the data used in those studies the majority of
Americans were claiming benets at age 65, while in the 1980s and 1990s the peak started to move
towards age 62. By the end of the 1990s, almost 60% of older Americans were claiming benets
at age 62, and it has stayed at that level, even with the implementation of the 1983 Amendments
that penalize early claiming of benets and the substantial increase in expected longevity since the
1970s. In fact, as of July 2007, 70.7% of men and 75.6% of women claimed Social Security bene-
ts before the Normal Retirement Age (NRA), compared to 36% and 59% in 1970, respectively.4
Clearly, the economic incentives seem to be insufcient to achieve the objective of prolonging
2 For example, President Reagan, after signing the legislation stated Our elderly need no longer fear that the
checks they depend on will be stopped or reduced. These amendments protect them. Americans of middle age need no
longer worry whether their career-long investment will pay-off. These amendments guarantee it.
3 For a survey of this broad retirement literature see Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999). Hurd (1990), Lumsdaine
(1995), and Ruhm (1996) provide good discussions of the earlier literature.
4 See the Social Security Bulletin, OASDI Monthly Statistics, 1970 - 2007.
2average work lives, given the strong correlation between benet claiming and labor supply.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which the perceptions of future cuts might
explain the puzzle of earlier take-up despite bigger penalties for doing so. If further cuts are antici-
pated, then individuals may be weighing early certain benet amounts against expected reductions
in the amount should they postpone retirement. Few papers have analyzed expectations over So-
cial Security reforms. B¨ utler (1999) presents a fteen periods Overlapping Generations model to
analyze the effects of expected and unexpected reforms, and Phelan (1999) discusses more real-
istic characterizations of that model. One important difference between their work and ours is
that we analyze individual-level behavioral effects of reform expectations that do not necessarily
materialize in the short to medium run, instead of focusing on aggregate effects of reforms that do
materialize. More recently, Sabelhaus and Topoleski (2007) analyze the aggregate effects of link-
ing a future benets level to economic and demographic outcomes. Interestingly, this link is what
Phelan (2006) labels an uncertainty minimizing policy, but he nds that it cannot be sustained in
equilibrium if the government type follows a Markov process, between opportunistic governments
and trustworthy governments.
The present work shows that one of the keys to modeling the complex incentive structure of the
US Old Age Benets system is to account for the Earnings Test (ET) that directly impacts claim-
ing and labor supply between the Early Retirement Age (ERA) and the NRA. Most researchers,
have only focused on the taxation aspects of the Earnings Test provisions, and have not prop-
erly modeled the actuarial fairness of the system. Even the most sophisticated dynamic models
of retirement have failed to explain the large proportion of Americans claiming early retirement
without making assumptions about preferences for early retirement that are difcult to test and
justify. We nd that by accounting for the full set of incentives of the ET, and by modeling reform
3expectations through the introduction of a small amount of uncertainty (based on self-reported re-
sponses to questions regarding expectations over future cuts in the Health and Retirement Study)
of a benet cut, we are able to match the claiming behavior observed in the data without relying
on heterogeneous preferences as in Gustman and Steinmeier (2002). Those authors use a dynamic
life cycle model that varies rate of time preference across individuals to explain the early claiming
rates observed in the data. They measure rate of time preference using accumulated assets under
the assumptionthat those with higher rates would have saved less, drivingtheir otherwise irrational
desire to retire earlier. Notice that given the well known lack of non-parametric identication of
dynamic structural models (see Rust 1994, Taber 2000, and Magnac and Thesmar 2002), the re-
liance on preference heterogeneity to explain behavior is less desirable than being able to account
for it through the appropriate incentives, or even empirically grounded homogeneous beliefs about
future events affecting economic constraints.
Any analysis of the effects of Social Security reforms should be performed within a model
that can explain early take-up behavior and accounts for the full incentive structure. We nd that
a misspecied dynamic retirement model would erroneously predict that an increase in the NRA
would delay claiming behavior and increase labor supply at older ages (see Gustman and Stein-
meier 1985, for an early discussion of the possible consequences of the 1983 reforms). This kind
of rationale seemed to have motivated (and still continues to motivate, rather surprisingly given
the inadequate results of previous similar reforms) the advocates of reforms to the SSA system,
who hoped to obtain further nancial relief for the Social Security system from the additional tax
revenue resulting from an extension of the work lives of later claimers. The policy debate around
the time of the deliberations of the National Commissionleading to the 1983 reforms of the system
shows that the idea of affecting individuals' working-lifetime was at the forefront of the discussion
4about the increases in the NRA (see Myers 1993, p. 316). This idea lived on, both in the popular
press and in the policy arena, when those reforms were proven to be insufcient (see e.g., Brown
1996, p. 32, Rejda 1999, p. 112, World Bank 1994, pp. 323-324).
Once the appropriate ET incentives are modeled and the probability that the system will be
reformed is accounted for, an increase in the NRA, consistent with the data, has little effect on
claiming behavior and may even increase the proportion of individuals claiming before the NRA.
This suggests that any policy that does not affect the ratio between the benets received at dif-
ferent ages (for example, any further increases in the NRA, which effectively imply equal cuts of
benets across claiming ages) should not be expected to have much impact on claiming behavior.
Therefore, the effect on labor supply is likely to be much weaker.
Section 2 provides additional background on retirement incentivesand claiming behavior. Sec-
tion 3 discusses Social Security reform expectations. Section 4 describes the dynamic structural
model that we use to analyze the impact of uncertainty over Social Security reform, and the con-
sequences of changes in the NRA. Section 5 presents the results of the simulations of the model,
and discusses the policy implications of our ndings. Section 6 concludes with a short discussion
of policy alternatives.
2 The Old Age Benets Incentive System
Social Security provides fairly complex incentives that affect the labor supply and benet uptake
behavior of individuals between the ERA and the maximum retirement age. These incentives are
especially involved between the early and Normal Retirement Ages, and we analyze them in detail
in theAppendix. Twoof the mostimportantincentivesare theSocial Security EarningsTest, which
5determines the maximum level of earnings that do not result in a benet reduction for individuals
who have claimed retirement benets before the NRA, and the Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF),
which determines the permanent reduction in benets that individuals face if they claim benets
early. However, the role of the Earnings Test in the context of the adjustment of the ARF is not
very well understood, or even known by many.
Although researchers have occasionally documented these fairly complex incentives, they have
paid relatively little attention to the possible consequences of these provisions for labor supply and
claiming behavior of early retirees.5 The existing research has primarily focused on the taxation
aspects of the Earnings Test.6 Since the removal of the Earnings Test in the year 2000 for those
above the NRA, there has been relatively little discussion of the Earnings Test for younger retirees,
despite the fact that the arguments used against the former Earnings Test also apply to this case.
In fact, the incentives provided by the Earnings Test for early retirees have remained essentially
unchanged in the last three decades, but with a larger fraction of Americans retiring early, these in-
centives have become increasingly important. The literature has not addressed the implications of
the possibilityto affect the Actuarial Reduction Factor by working after claimingbenets and earn-
ing above the Earnings Test limit for labor supply and claiming behavior. We will show through
our dynamic model that the appropriate modeling of these incentives is key in order to understand
the claiming behavior of Older Americans.
Table 1, usingdata fromTable6.A4of SSA'sStatisticalSupplement,showshowprevalenttake-
up at the earliest possible age has become. The peaks are at the eligibility ages of 62 and 65 which
5 Gustman and Steinmeier (1991), Myers (1993, p. 52), and Gruber and Orszag (2003) discuss this mechanism in
some detail.
6 See Vroman (1985), Burtless and Moftt (1985), Honig and Reimers (1989), Leonesio (1990), Reimers and
Honig (1993), Reimers and Honig (1996), Friedberg (1998), Baker and Benjamin (1999), Friedberg (2000), and
Votruba (2003).
6comes as no surprise given this well established response to program incentives. Between 1994
and 2005, almost 60% of claimants have been taking their benets at age 62, and between 15% and
20% wait for the normal age of retirement. A majority of the remaining individualsclaim at age 63
or 64, with a very small proportion claiming after the NRA. The latter is worth emphasizing given
that the Delayed Retirement Credit increased by half a percentage pointevery two years during this
period. Notice the rather anomalous claiming behavior in 2000, which resulted in an increase in
claiming at age 65, and a reduction of the proportion of individuals claiming at 62. This is driven
by the large increase in new entitlements at age 65 and above in that year, very likely the product
of the removal of the ET for those above the NRA, which made waiting to claim benets because
of a strong attachment to the labor force unnecessary. This conjecture is further supported by the
evidence on benets levels of the next table.
Table 2, also using data from the Statistical Supplement, shows the trends in benets received,
in dollars of 2005, as a function of the age at which benets where claimed. We see a clear break
in the patterns after 2000, especially in terms of the benet levels at the NRA and above. In 1999
and 2000 later claiming led to consistently larger benets, while the maximum benet has been
systematically obtained by those claiming at 65 since then. It drops sharply for those claiming
after 65, potentially because those individuals are now of a type trying to catch up to compensate
for a low wage career, or a sketchy one. Our interpretation of this evidence is that the removal of
the ET for those above the NRA had the effect of allowing people to claim benets independently
of their labor supply behavior, leading relatively well-off individuals, who before waited to claim
to avoid the ET, to claim sooner. Those claiming after the NRA are now either individuals trying to
catch up after relatively lower wage career proles, or spouses claiming on their partner's earnings
histories. Notice that the scheduled increases in the NRA are essentially bringing back the old ET
7for those above age 65, so the prediction is that a pre-ET-reform benet level distribution is likely
to emerge, at least in part, in the next years. It is important to emphasize that this table does not
account for the actuarial reduction of benets faced by individualsclaiming before the NRA, or for
the delayed retirement credit obtained by those after the NRA. In this research we are interested in
the ination-adjusted level of benets actually received by claimers since this is what our dynamic
model of retirement predicts.7
3 Social Security Reform Expectations
What the public debates on the need for Social Security Reform have certainly accomplished is
to instill uncertainty over future Social Security benet amounts, despite the increasing amount
of information being provided regarding ones benet amounts under current rules (Mastrobuoni,
2006). While it is true that individuals are better informed now than ever about how much they
should expect to get under current rules given the start of regular mailings containing that infor-
mation, people expect that these benets are subject to change. And they know the direction of the
change, one way or another benets will be cut.
If furthercutsare anticipated,thenindividualsmaybeweighinginearlycertainbenetamounts
against expected reductions in the full amount should they postpone retirement. At the margin, we
would expect people to continue to retire earlier despite the increasing penalties for doing so, if
they expect the gain to waiting it out to be declining and possibly approaching zero.
To illustratethe mechanismwe believeisat play regardingSocial Security reform expectations,
imagine two individualswith identical Primary Insurance Amounts(PIAs). One of them expects to
7 It is clear that analyzing the role of (theoretically) actuarially fair adjustments is important to understand the
importance of individual heterogeneity in claiming behavior. Ben´ tez-Silva and Yin (2007) focus on this point and
nd considerable individual heterogeneity in benets receipt, especially for those above the NRA.
8receive a given amount upon retirement at age 65 with certainty, while the other believes that there
is a reasonable probability (could be quite small) of the benet amount to decline for retirement
at age 65 by the time he reaches that age. The incentives to hold out for the full benet amount,
at the margin, are higher for the person who believes the payoff is a certain amount. Hence, if
individuals believe that holding out is risky, they might opt out earlier. This suggests that policies
that cut benets and reduce dependency ratios may not realize the desired effects, unless they are
perceived as a complete solution to the nancial crisis of the system. Otherwise, the concerns over
solvency are likely to continue.8
To calculate the perceived probability that a drop in benets will occur, we use data from a
ten year panel based on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Specically, we examine the
responses to questions regarding expectations over future benets between the years of 1992 and
2002. The responses reveal perceptions of a 60% probability, on average, of benets becoming
less generous within the next 10 years from individuals who began the survey at the pre-retirement
eligibility ages of 51 to 61. The cumulative probability of that happening in a period of 10 years
implies a 4.825% expectation of a drop in the next year. The HRS asked questions regarding the
propensity for Social Security to make benets less generous on a scale of 1 to 10. In the later
years the question was altered slightly to add a time framesome time in the next 10 years. This
did not signicantly alter the results. Given the magnitude of these responses, uncertainty over
future benets is warranted in our models of benet take-up.
In order to gauge the expected size of the benet cut, we note that a recent report by the
Trustees of the Social Security system, SSA (2007), states that, in order to maintain solvency in
8 Other plausible explanations for the trends toward earlier claiming of benets include increased longevity but
worsened functional capacity for work (health as a taste shifter toward leisure), and an increased demand for leisure
over time that offsets the higher price of leisure so that empirically it appears to be a Giffen good.
9the long-run, the immediate and permanent cuts should be of around 13% of benets in real terms.
Individuals are likely responding to a more modest cut, predicting that the necessary burden will
likely spread across cohorts. We assume individuals believe a permanent cut of 5.75% of benets
could occur, a level roughly equivalent to about a one year loss in benets for the average person,
and therefore a reasonable expectation for the average person.9
4 The Dynamic Model
The model used in this paper is closely related to those presented in Rust and Phelan (1997),
and Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and 2006). Rust and Phelan (1997) did not model
consumption and savings decisions, but did estimate the parameters of the model, using a Nested
Fixed-Point algorithm, instead of calibrating them. Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and
2006) present the most closely related models, which are calibrated to match aggregate data and
household level data from the Health and Retirement Study, and model the Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance decisions on top of the OASI incentives. Unlike the structural model developed
in the present paper, these earlier models (or any other structural models we are aware of) do not
explicitly accounted for the possibility of affecting the Actuarial Reduction, or the possibility of
expecting a possible benet cut in the future. Our model also shares a number of characteristics
with the work of French (2005), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005), and Blau (2004) among other
researchers who solve, simulate, and in some cases estimate, dynamic retirement models under
uncertainty.
We assume that individuals live a maximum of 100 years, and face mortality probabilities sim-
9 The qualitative results we will present in the next sections are robust to the assumptions regarding probability of
the drop, and the size of the drop. Quantitatively, however, they are robust as long as higher drops are expected with
slightly smaller probabilities, and vice-versa.
10ilar to those in the population. They start their working lives at age 21, and maximize the expected
discounted stream of future utility, where the per period utility function u
￿
c
￿ l
￿ h
￿ t
￿ depends on
consumption c, leisure l, health status h, and age t. We specify a utility function for which more
consumption is better than less, with agents expressing a moderate level of risk aversion. The ip
side of utility of leisure is the disutilityof work. We assume that the utility(disutilityof work) is an
increasing function of age, is higher for individuals who are in worse health than individuals who
are in good health, and is lower for individuals with higher human capital measured by the average
wage. In addition, we assume that the worse an individual's health is, the lower their overall level
of utility is, holding everything else constant. Moreover, we assume that individuals obtain utility
from bequeathing wealth to heirs after they die. This model assumes that individuals are forward
looking, and discount future periods at a constant rate b, assumed here to be equal to 0.96.
The model also allows for a variety of sources of uncertainty, like lifetime uncertainty, health
uncertainty, wage uncertainty, and more importantly, Social Security benets level uncertainty. We
will see in the next section that the latter is essential to match the large peak of benets claiming
at age 62. Notice, however, that within the model, this uncertainty is never realized, and benets
are never cut, but the existence of a small probability of the event happening affects behavior, and
results in claiming benets earlier, consistently with the empirical evidence.
Any person who is not already receiving Social Security Old Age benets is eligible to apply
for OASI benets.10 Individuals with at least 40 quarters of earnings covered for OASI before
reaching their 62nd birthday are eligible to apply and benet award is guaranteed. In the present
version of the model we allow decisions to be made on an annual basis and assume no lag between
10 We are abstracting from Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), a program that allows workers with se-
vere disabilities to receive Social Security benets before the NRA. This program currently covers about 7 million
Americans. See Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and 2006) for a life-cycle model of retirement and SSDI
application.
11application date and date of rst receipt.
Calculation of benets and the reduction factors are as explained in the Appendix on incentives
for early retirement, assuming a NRA of 66. In particular the number of checks received in a
year depends on the earnings after claiming: the number of checks (or the benet amount on
some checks received towards the end of the period) are reduced reecting the 50% rate on labor
incomes exceeding the Earnings Test limit between 62 and the January of the year a person turns
65 (33% thereafter). In other words, adjustments to benets and ARFs occurs in accordance with
the earnings and the Earnings Test limit, and we do not consider the possibility that beneciaries
ask Social Security for a reduction of benets or return benets received. Even though we set up
an annual decision-making process, the Social Security Earnings Test is enforced semiannually,
i.e. the benets received by a beneciary are adjusted, after reaching the NRA, for the earnings in
excess of the Earnings Test limit, as long as six months or more, of benets were withheld in the
years between the early and Normal Retirement Ages. The structure and the details of the model
are described below.
4.1 Model Details
We solvethe dynamiclife-cyclemodelbybackward induction,andby discretizingthe spacefor the
continuous state variables.11 The terminal age is 100 and the age when individuals are assumed
to enter the labor force is 21. Prior to their 62nd birthday, agents in our model make a leisure
and consumption decision in each period. At 62 and until age 70, individuals decide on leisure,
consumption, and application for OASI benets, denoted
￿ lt
￿ ct
￿ ssdt
￿ , at the beginning of each
period, where lt denotes leisure, ct denotes consumption, which is treated as a continuous decision
11 See Rust (1996), and Judd (1998) for a survey of numerical methods in economics.
12variable, and ssdt denotes the individual's Social Security benefit claiming decisions.
After age 70 is assumed that all individuals have claimed benets, and again only consumption
and leisure choices are possible. Leisure time is normalized to 1, where lt
￿ 1 is dened as not
working at all, lt
￿
￿
￿ 543 corresponds to full time work, and lt
￿
￿
￿ 817 denotes part-time work.
These quantities correspond to the amount of waking time spent non-working, assuming that a
full-time job requires 2000 hours per year a part-time job requires 800 hours per year. We assume
two possible values for ssdt. If ssdt equals 1 the agent has initiated the receipt of benets. If the
individual has not led for benets or is not eligible then ssdt is equal to 0.
If benets are claimed before the NRA the monthly benet amount is calculated similar to
equation (9) in the Appendix. For a NRA of 66 years the reduction factor if claimed at 62 is
75%, 80.0% if claimed at 63, 86.67% if claimed at 63, and 93.33% if claimed at 65. Due to the
Earnings Test, benet initiation between the ERA and the NRA does not necessarily imply benet
receipt, nor is the reduction in the benet rate necessarily permanent after the NRA as a result of
the adjustment of the ARFs as discussed in the Appendix (see equation (10)). In particular, we
use an annual Earnings Test limit of $12,480 between 62 and 65 and $33,240 between 65 and 66
(these numbers reect the 2006 limits). In the former period benets are reduced at a rate of $1
per $2 of earnings above the limit and $1 per $3 of earnings above the limit for the latter period.
These are the correct rules for someone who turns 66 in December. Since those whose birthday is
earlier in the year face the higher limit and lower tax rate for less than a year (January to month of
birthday) we have also simulated two alternative versions, one with the $12,480 limit throughout,
and another using $20,760, the midpoint between the two limits and a tax rate of 50%. The results
of these models do not differ markedly from those presented in the paper and are available from
the authors upon request. Those claiming after 66 earn the delayed retirement credit. We model
13it following the rates faced by the 1943-1954 cohorts, of 2/3 of 1% for each month not claimed
between age 66 and 70.
We also incorporate a detailed model of taxation of other income, including the progressive
federal income tax schedule (including the negative tax known as the EITC  Earned Income Tax
Credit), and state and local income, sales and property taxes. Individuals whose combined income
(including Social Security benets) exceeds a given threshold must pay Federal income taxes on
a portion of their Social Security benets. We incorporate these rules in our model as well as the
15.75% Social Security payroll tax.
The model allows for four different sources of uncertainty: (a) lifetime uncertainty: modeled
to match the Life Tables of the United States with age and health specic survival probabilities;
(b) wage uncertainty: modeled to follow a log-normal distribution, function of average wages as
explained in more detail below; (c) health uncertainty: assumed to evolve in a Markovian fashion
usingempirical transitionprobabilitiesfrom a variety of householdsurveys, includingthe NLSY79
and the HRS. The random draws to simulate these three sources of uncertainty are the same for all
the models compared in this paper, such that the differences presented in the results are only due
to the changes in the incentive schemes; (d) Social Security benet level uncertainty: this is one of
the main contributions to the paper and we explain it in detail below.
Regarding the latter type of uncertainty, we rst assume that agents believe there is a chance
of benets being cut in the future. Second, at age 62 they believe that if they do not claim benets
then there is a small probability of those benets being lower in the future. These beliefs are never
realized in the simulations of the model, but are present in the expectations of the agents, resulting
in possible changes in behavior. As explained in the previous section, we use reasonable parameter
values based on aggregate data and household surveys.
14The state of an individual at any point during the life cycle can be summarized by ve state
variables: (i) Current aget; (ii) net(tangible)wealth wt; (iii)theindividual'sSocial Security benet
claiming state sst; (iv) the individual's health status, and (v) the individual's average wage, awt.12
For computational simplicity, we assume that decisions are made annually rather than monthly,
but we allow for the benet adjustments due to earnings above the Earnings Test limit to happen
semi-annually. This means that although individuals can only decide to claim benets at the time
they turn 62, 63, etc. their Social Security state can be updated every year, depending in their
labor earnings, to reect that their benets will be adjusted for benets withheld for periods of six
months, or one year. Since the adjustment in benets becomes effective only after they reach the
NRA individuals still receive benets at the original claiming rate in the period between the time
of withholding of benets until the NRA, consistent with current rules.
The sst variable can assume up to fourteen mutually exclusive values between 62 and 66:
sst
￿ 0 (not entitled to benets), sst
￿ 62 (entitled to OASI benets at the ERA), and sst
￿
62
￿ 5
￿ 63
￿ 63n
￿ 63
￿ 5
￿ 64
￿ 64n
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 65
￿ 5
￿ 66
￿ 66nrepresents the remaining 12 Social Security states cor-
responding to the level of benets individuals will receive when they reach the NRA. For individ-
uals who decide to claim after the NRA, sst can take four additional values, age 67 to 70, since
everyone is assumed to claim no later than age 70. We created an additional (implicit state) vari-
able, ssnt, which can assume up to ve mutually exclusive values: ssnt
￿ 0 (all benets received,
i.e. no benets withheld), ssnt
￿ 1 (representing an original claim at age 62 of someone who had
some benets withheld; this applies, for example, to individuals with a sst equal to 62
￿ 5, 63n,
12 This translates into a problem with over half a million states in which to solve the model (80 periods, 15 dis-
cretized wealth states, 8 discretized average wage states, 3 health states, and 18 Social Security states). We are able to
solve this model and simulate it 10,000 times in under 20 minutes in a Dual-Processor Linux Machine with 3.6GHz
Xeon Processors using Gauss, and exploiting its capability to link dynamic libraries written in C by the authors and
some of their co-authors. These C libraries perform over 95% of the computations involved in solving and simulating
these models. The code used for these simulations is available upon request, and will eventually be available on the
web.
15or 64n), ssnt
￿ 2 (representing an original claim at age 63 for someone who had some benets
withheld), ssnt
￿ 3 (representing an original claim at age 64 for someone who had some benets
withheld), etc. With this structure we are able to separate, for example, whether someone is a 63
claimer, denoted by sst
￿ 63, or is really a 62 claimer who has accumulated one year of withheld
benets, represented here bysst
￿ 63n. These two individualswill receivethe same amountof ben-
ets after the NRA, but their benet would differ before the NRA, as explained in the Appendix,
and in additional detail in Ben´ tez-Silva and Heiland (2006, and 2007).
In addition to age, wealth, health, Social Security status, Benet Adjustment status, and current
income, the average indexed wage is a key variable in the dynamic model, serving two roles:
(1) it acts as a measure of permanent income that serves as a convenient sufcient statistic for
capturing serial correlation and predicting the evolution of annual wage earnings; and (2) it is key
to accurately model the rules governing payment of the Social Security benets. An individual's
highest 35 years of earnings are averaged and the resulting Average Indexed Earnings (AIE) is
denoted as awt. The PIA is the potential Social Security benet rate for retiring at the NRA. It is a
piece-wise linear, concave function of awt, whose value is denoted by pia
￿
awt
￿ .
In principle, one needs to keep as state variables the entire past earnings history. To avoid this,
we follow Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006) and approximate the evolution of average
wages in a Markovian fashion, i.e., period t
￿ 1 average wage, awt
￿ 1, is predicted using only
age, t, current average wage, awt, and current period earnings, yt. Within a log-normal regression
model, we follow Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003), such that:
log
￿
awt
￿ 1
￿
￿ g1
￿ g2log
￿
yt
￿
￿
￿ g3log
￿
awt
￿
￿
￿ g4t
￿ g5t2
￿ et
￿ (1)
The R2 for this type of regression is very high, with an extremely small estimated standard error,
resulting from the low variability of the
￿ awt
￿ sequences. This is a key aspect of the model given
16the important computational simplication that allows us to accurately model the Social Security
rules in our DP model with minimal number of state variables.
We then use the observed sequence of average wages as regressors to estimate the following
log-normal regression model of an individual's annual earnings:
log
￿
yt
￿ 1
￿
￿ a1
￿ a2log
￿
awt
￿
￿
￿ a3t
￿ a4t2
￿ ht
￿ (2)
This equation describes the evolution of earnings for full-time employment. Part-time workers
are assumed to earn a pro-rata share of the full-time earnings level (i.e., part-time earnings are
0
￿ 8
￿ 800
￿ 2000 of the full-time wage level given in equation (2)). The factor of 0
￿ 8 incorporates the
assumption that the rate of pay working part-time is 80% of the full-time rate. Using the history of
earnings from the restricted HRS data set we obtained very high R2 using this methodology.
The advantage of using awt instead of the actual Average Indexed Earnings is that awt becomes
a sufcient statistic for the person's earnings history. Thus we need only keep track of awt, and
update it recursively using the latest earnings according to (1), rather than having to keep track
of the entire earnings history in order to determine the 35 highest earnings years, which the AIE
requires.
For the 1943-1954 cohort the NRA is 66 and the PIA is permanently reduced after the NRA by
an actuarial reduction factor of exp
￿
￿
￿
g1
￿
k
￿
ad jm
￿
￿
￿ , where k is the number of years prior to the
NRA but after the ERA that the individual rst starts receiving OASI benets and ad jm corrects
for periods where no benets were received due to earnings above the Earnings test limit. Before
the NRA, benets are reduced by an actuarial reduction factor of exp
￿
￿
￿
g1k
￿ . In the absence of
adjustments to the ARFs, the actuarial reduction rate for the 1943 to 1954 cohort is g1
￿
￿
￿ 0713,
which results in a reduced benet of 75% of the PIA for an individual who rst starts receiving
OASI benets at age 62 in the absence of any adjustments of the ARFs. In the policy simulations
17that increase the NRA to 67, the reduced benet at age 62 is 70% of the PIA.
To increase the incentives to delay retirement, the 1983 Social Security reforms gradually in-
creased the NRA from 65 to 67 and increased the delayed retirement credit. This is a permanent
increase in the PIA by a factor of exp
￿ g2l
￿ , where l denotes the number of years after the NRA
that the individual delays receiving OASI benets. The rate g2 is being gradually increased over
time. The relevant value for the 1943 to 1954 cohort is g2
￿ 0
￿ 0769, which corresponds to an in-
crease in 8% in benets per year of delay after the NRA. The maximum value of l is MRA
￿
NRA,
where MRA denotes a maximum retirement age (currently 70), beyond which further delays in
retirement yield no further increases in PIA. Clearly, it is not optimal to delay applying for OASI
benets beyond the MRA, because due to mortality, further delays generally reduce the present
value of OASI benets the person will collect over their remaining lifetime.
We assume that the individual's utility is given by
ut
￿
c
￿ l
￿ h
￿ age
￿
￿
cg
￿
1
g
￿ f
￿
age
￿ h
￿ aw
￿ log
￿
l
￿
￿
2h
￿ (3)
where h denotes the health status and f
￿
age
￿ h
￿ aw
￿ is a weight that can be interpreted as the relative
disutilityof work. We usethesame specicationfor f andthe disutilityfromworkingasinBen´ tez-
Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006). The disutility of work increases with age, and is uniformly
higher the worse one's health is. If an individual is in good health, the disutility of work increases
muchmoregraduallywithage comparedtothepoorhealth, ordisabledhealth,states. Thedisutility
of work decreases with average wage. We postulate that high wage workers, especially highly
educated professionals, have better working conditions than most lower wage blue collar workers,
whose jobs are more likely to involve less pleasant, more repetitive, working conditions and a
higher level of physical labor.
We assume that there are no time or nancial costs involved in applying for OASI benets. The
18parameter g indexes the individual's level of risk aversion. As g
￿ 0 the utility of consumption
approaches log
￿
c
￿ . We use g
￿
￿
￿ 37, which corresponds to a moderate degree of risk aversion,
i.e., implied behavior that is slightly more risk averse than that implied by logarithmic preferences.
LetVt
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ ss
￿ h
￿ denotethe individual'svaluefunction, the expectedpresent discountedvalue
of utility from age t onward for an individual with current wealth w, average wage aw, in Social
Security state ss and health state h. We solved the DP problem via numerical computation of the
Bellman recursion for Vt given by
Vt
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ ss
￿ h
￿
￿ max
0
￿ c
￿ w
l
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 54
￿
￿
￿81
￿1
￿
ssd
￿ At
￿ ss
￿
Vt
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ ss
￿ c
￿ l
￿ ssd
￿ h
￿
 
￿ where (4)
Vt
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ ss
￿ c
￿ l
￿ ssd
￿ h
￿
￿ ut
￿
c
￿ l
￿ h
￿
￿
￿ b
!1
￿
dt
￿
h
￿
#
" EVt
￿ 1
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ ss
￿ c
￿ l
￿ ssd
￿ h
￿
 
￿
￿ dt
￿
h
￿ EB
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ ss
￿ c
￿ l
￿ ssd
￿ h
￿
￿ (5)
where At
￿
ss
￿ denotes the set of feasible Social Security choices for a person of age t in Social
Security state ss and dt
￿
h
￿ denotes the age and health-specic mortality rate, B
￿
w
￿ is the bequest
function, and EB denotes its conditional expectation. We have used the HRS and AHEAD data
to estimate age and health-specic death rates, but since there is little data on individuals over
80 years old we make parametric smoothness assumptions on the dt
￿
h
￿ function (basically a logit
functional form that is polynomial in t and has dummy variables for the various health states h)
and subject the estimates to the further restriction that for each t the expected hazard over h should
equal the unconditionalage-specic death rates given in the 1997 edition of the U.S. Decennial life
tables.13 The function EVt
￿ 1 denotes the conditional expectation of next period's value function,
given the individual's current state
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ ss
￿ h
￿ and decision
￿
c
￿ l
￿ ssd
￿ . Specically, we have
13 De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006) nd that more sophisticated mortality characterizations do not seem to
signicantly improve the t of a related dynamic structural model which focuses on post-retirement saving behavior.
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￿
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￿
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￿ ss
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(
.
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where awpt
￿
aw
￿ y
￿ is the Markovian updating rule that approximates Social Security's exact for-
mula for updating an individual's average wage, and wpt summarizes the law of motion for next
period's wealth, that is,
wpt
￿
w
￿ aw
￿ y
￿ ss
￿ ssd
￿
￿ R
/ w
￿ ssbt
￿
aw
￿ y
(
￿ ss
￿ ssd
￿
￿
￿ y
(
￿
t
￿
y
(
￿ w
￿
￿
c
0
1
￿ (7)
where R is the return on saving, and t
￿
y
￿ w
￿ is the tax function, which includes income taxes such
as Federal income taxes and Social Security taxes and potentially other types of state/local income
and property/wealth taxes. The awpt function, derived from (1), is given by
awpt
￿
aw
￿ y
￿
￿ exp
2 g1
￿ g2log
￿
y
￿
￿
￿ g3log
￿
aw
￿
￿
￿ g4t
￿ g5t2
￿ s2
￿ 2
3
4
￿ (8)
where s is the estimated standard error in the regression (1). Note there is a potential Jensen's
inequality problem here due to the fact that we have substituted the conditional expectation of
wt
￿ 1 into the next period value function Vt
￿ 1 over wt
￿ 1 and awt
￿ 1 jointly. However, as noted
above, the R2 for the regression of awt
￿ 1 on awt is virtually 1 with an extremely small estimated
standard error  s. In this case there is virtually no error resulting from substituting what is an
essentially deterministic mapping determining awt
￿ 1 from wt
￿ 1 and awt.
Above, ft
￿
y
+aw
￿ isa log-normaldistributionofcurrentearnings, givencurrentaget andaverage
wealth aw, that is implied by (2) under the additional assumption of normality of errors ht. The
discrete conditional probability distributions gt
￿
ss
(
+aw
￿ w
￿ ss
￿ ssd
￿ and kt
￿
h
(
+h
￿ reect the transition
probabilities in the Social Security and health states, respectively.
20Finally, toaccount for theSocial Security reformexpectations, we introduceintheoptimization
process the possibility that with a probability of 4.825%, the agents faced a modied equation (4),
with a modied equation (6) and modied law of motion for wealth, which embeds a permanent
drop in benets of 5.75%.
5 Simulation Results and Policy Experiments
Table 3 reports results from three different models of Social Security, assuming a NRA of 66.14
Model 1 treats the Earnings Test as a pure tax on earnings above the corresponding ET limit, which
is how it may be perceived by a proportion of the general public given the difculties in under-
standing the role of the adjustment factors when working beyond benet take-up (Ben´ tez-Silva
and Heiland, 2006 and 2007), and how a majority of researchers have modeled these incentives.
Using this framework, our model of optimal behavior predicts that only about 35% of claimers
would take up at age 62, with a much smaller peak at 65 at roughly 18%, with a bulk of the
remaining beneciaries claiming at the ages in between. Benets, given this behavior, increase
slightly with age at all points so that there are economic incentives for delaying take-up.
With the implementation of the proper Earnings Test incentives, which allow for the modica-
tion of the actuarial reduction factor through work after take-up with earnings above the ET limit,
Model 2 shows a trend towards earlier claiming of benets. This moves us closer to the actual
take-up rates with a jump from only 35% claiming at 62 in Model 1 to over 48% in Model 2. The
actual current take-up rate is around 56.6% (SSA Statistical Supplement, 2006). There continues
to be a second smaller peak at age 65 with 23% of the sample holding out for the unpenalized NRA
14 In this paper we focus on claiming behavior and labor supply, but the model also simulates the evolution of
wealth, consumption, and wages over the life cycle. As shown in Ben´ tez-Silva, Buchinksy, and Rust (2006), in a
related model, the predictions of the model are consistent with the HRS data.
21benet. Only 4% of the sample hold off their benet take-up until after 65 when the penalty for
working after take-up is reduced, compared to 11% in Model 1.
While the biggest gains towards actual behavior come from adding the possibility of affecting
the adjustment factors to the model, the predictions match the actual pattern closely once Social
Security benet uncertainty is added (Model 3). The predicted benet take-up when individuals
perceive a potential risk to delaying take-up increases to 59%, compared to the 57% actual take
up rates at this age. The peak at age 65 falls to 21% compared to predictions from Model 2
(which predicts 23% take-up), and this again is closer to the actual rate of 19%. More people are
willing to take lower benets earlier, knowing they can move closer to the full benet with the
ARF adjustments, and preferring the actuarial reduction with certainty over future uncertain cuts.
The comparisonbetween Models 2 and 3 provides a sense of the effects of reducing uncertainty
over reforms. We can see that Model 2 predicts more full-time work, especially at age 62, but also
in later ages, due to the strong connection between claiming behavior and labor supply. These
results are broadly consistent with the ndings of B¨ utler's (1999), who indicates that uncertainty
considerations are important, and that governments can reduce the amount of uncertainty agents
have to deal with, resulting in welfare improving allocations, by providing better information re-
garding the timing and the type of reforms in store.
One of the advantages of dynamic models is that it allows us to perform a welfare analysis.
We have computed compensating variations, which capture the willingness to pay, or in this case
the need to be compensated, for having to face the uncertainty over Social Security reforms. We
nd that given that the uncertainties are never realized, the differences in welfare are very small,
and affect only a small proportion of individuals. Only about 5% of individuals in our simulations
see a drop in their welfare, and among those the drops in welfare account for less than 1.5% of
22their average wealth in the simulations. This suggests that even though the changes in behavior
resulting from this source of uncertainty are clearly non-trivial, many of the individuals forced to
claim earlier were originally close to indifferent with respect to claiming at other ages.
The last column in the three panels of Table 3 shows the benet levels predicted by the model.
Notice how close they are to the actual benets received by Older Americans, which we reported in
Table 2. This provides further conrmation that our model accurately matches the observed benet
distribution qualitatively, and quantitatively, even in dollar terms. Given that we are using a NRA
of 66, and individuals face the Earnings Test between age 65 and 66 as a result, the relationship
between benet levels at different ages is closer to that present in the period before the elimination
of the ET for those above the NRA. This translates in the prediction that later claimers obtain
higher benets.
Table 4 simulates behavioral responses to an increase in the NRA to 67. We resolve and re-
simulate the same three models with this modication. If the Earnings Test only had the taxation
aspect, an increase intheNRA to67wouldyieldtheintendedbehavioralresponses,delayed benet
take-up and greater incidence of retirement. With the original NRA of 66, more than half of the
beneciaries claim by age 63. When the NRA increases about half of the beneciaries are claiming
at ages 65 and 66. As shown in the last column, this group is working more to earn the same
benets, consistent with the expected effects of a cut in benets. Overall, the predicted responses
do not follow the patterns in the data very closely.
Adding in the appropriate ET rules leads us to conclude that with a more realistic set of incen-
tives, the predictions move signicantly closer to the observed behavior. With the higher NRA, the
take up rate at 62 increases holding the rest of the features of Model 2 constant. There is no longer
a peak at 65 nor is there one at 67. The next peak after age 62 is at age 66. Model 3, which allows
23for uncertainties over future benet guarantees, captures the second peak at age 65, consistent with
the pattern observed in the data. The results suggest that increases in the NRA might not yield the
expected behavioral consequences; in fact, they may result in even earlier claiming of retirement
benets.
These ndings support the sound economic intuition that any policy that does not affect the
ratio between the benets received at different ages (for example, any further increases in the NRA,
which cut benets equally across claiming ages) should not be expected to have much impact
on claiming behavior, and therefore relatively little is to be expected in terms of labor supply
responses, except maybe some increases in order to compensate for the loss of benets.
6 Conclusions
Wedevelopadynamiclifecycleframeworkthataccountsforthemajorityofthecomplexitiesofthe
Old Age Social Security program, as well as expectations of future benet cuts, to predict benet
claimingbehaviorandlabor supply. TheattentiontothedetailsoftheincentivesprovidedbyOASS
and the modeling of plausible expectations regarding future benet cuts pays off, as we are able to
explain the puzzle of the large proportion of Older Americans claimingbenets early despite rising
longevity. We use the framework to show that the scheduled increases in the Normal Retirement
Age, and possible further increases that are being debated, have little impact on the retirement
incentives when properly modeled. This casts doubt on the efcacy of any reforms that cut benets
equally across claiming ages to promote lasting changes in behavior. From a policy perspective,
our simulation results illustrate the importance of basing policy analysis on models that account
for the actual incentive schemes and more realistic beliefs about future benets. Predictions of
24overly simplistic or clearly misspecied models can easily be erroneous and intuitions based on
simplistic models can lead to large miscalculations.
Given the reality of the Social Security burden, cuts will have to be made one way or another.
Our results suggest that mandating a set of cuts, with a serious commitment to resolving the sol-
vency issues of the program for more than a couple of decades, so that no further cuts are expected,
should delay take-up and alleviate, at least in part, the nancial crisis. However, the necessary cuts
for this plan to succeed might impose undue burden on a generation, potentially resulting in severe
welfare losses. The challenge can be understood in the context of the work of Auerbach and Hasset
(2006), who discuss sticky policies. Unfortunately when it comes to Social Security, policies are
not sticky enough so that there is little condence in future benet amounts among planners.
Recent work by Phelan (2006) shows that in this kind of situations the unique subgame perfect
equilibriumwhen government type follows a Markov process for this case would involve pe-
riodic benets cuts followed by long periods of moderate taxation to restore the trust on the system
by individuals. Interestingly, the government (and the individuals) would be better off if it could
crediblycommittoa timeinvariantpolicy. It appears that withrespect toitsSocial Security system,
the U.S. may be in such an equilibrium. Given that federal ofcials frequently stress that painful
reforms are still ahead, the population has yet to regain condence in the future of the system.
Given that the benet cuts necessary to make the system solvent in the long term (such as im-
mediate and permanent cuts of around 13% of benets, equivalent to increasing the NRA to age 68
as of 2008, or an immediate and permanent increase in the payroll tax of 1.95 percentage points, as
discussed by the Trustees of the Social Social Security Administration,SSA (2007, p. 3)) are likely
to be politically unfeasible, it is natural to consider less painful reforms such as the elimination of
the Earnings Test, the increase in the Early Retirement Age, or the adoption of a benet schedule
25that rewards later claimers. These reforms are unlikely to change individuals' expectations about
the solvencyproblems of the system, but may affect claiming behavior and labor supply. The elim-
ination of the ET might not have a large enough effect on labor supply to meaningfully address the
solvency problems of the system and likely leads to even earlier claiming.15 The increase in the
Early Retirement Age would mechanically delay claiming benets and likely increase labor supply
in the years leading to the new ERA, but would have a limited effect on the long run solvency of
the system. Furthermore, it is highly regressive given the socio-demographic composition of early
claimers. An alternative to those policies is to devise an actuarially unfair incentive structure in
which late claiming is rewarded via higher benets. The latter would be implemented hoping that
the actual labor supply responses, and the resulting tax revenues, compensate for the cost of such
a policy. While it is regressive, it might be less so than just increasing the Early Retirement Age.
15 See Ben´ tez-Silva and Heiland (2007), Song and Manchester (2007), French (2005), Song (2004), Gustman and
Steinmeier(2004),GruberandOrszag (2003),andDisneyandSmith (2001)fora discussionof thelaborsupplyeffects
of the removal of the Earnings Test.
26Appendix: Social Security Incentives for Early Retirement
Individuals who claim benets before the NRA but continue to work or reenter the labor force can
reduce the early retirement penalty by suspending benet payments.16 The Actuarial Reduction
Factor (or early retirement reduction factor), in turn, will be increased proportionallyto the number
of months without benets, which will increase benets permanently after the individual reaches
the NRA.17 This adjustment of the ARF allows those who become beneciaries before the NRA to
partially or completely reverse the nancial consequences of their decision, averting being locked-
inat thereduced rate. Inthe sequelof thissectionthe exactdetailsof theseincentivesare presented.
Benet Calculation
Individuals aged 62 or older who had earned income that was subject to the Social Security payroll
tax for at least 10 years since 1951 are eligible for retirement benets under the Old Age benets
program. Earnings are subject to the tax up to an income maximum that is updated annually
according to increases in the average wage.18 To determine the monthly benet amount (MBA),
the Social Security Administration calculates the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of a worker as
a concave piece-wise linear function of the worker's average earnings subject to Social Security
taxes taken over her 35 years of highest earnings. If the benets are claimed at the NRA (66 for
those born between 1943 and 1954, and currently at 65 and 8 months), the MBA equals the PIA.
If an individual decides to begin receiving benets before the NRA and exits the labor force or
stays below the earnings limit, her MBA is reduced by up to 25%, assuming a NRA of 66. Under
the current regulation of the OA program, the monthly benet amount received upon rst claiming
benets depends on the age (month) of initiation of Social Security benets, in the following way,
(9)
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where MBAt represents the monthly benet amount before the NRA (see SSA-S 2005, p.18).
Assuming that the individual continues to receive benets, her MBAt is permanently reduced. The
Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF) underlying this calculation is a permanent reduction of benets
by 5/9 of 1 percent per month for each month in which benets are received in the three years
16 In this paper, we are not considering spousal benets and joint decision making in the household. The complex-
ities introduced by those considerations are out of the scope of this analysis. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1991),
Coile, Diamond, Gruber,and Jousten (2002),and Votruba(2003)for a discussion. By ignoringspousal benets we are
not taking into account the fact that approximately 5.96% of the individuals who receive some type of Old Age, Sur-
vivors, or Disability Insurance (OASDI) benets receive them as spouses of entitled retirees. This percentage comes
from the Public-Use Microdata File providedby the Social Security Administrationand refers to a 1% random sample
of all beneciaries as of December of 2001.
17 Given a NRA of 66, which will be the prevailing one for the cohort born between 1943 and 1954, the Actuarial
Reduction Factor is a number between 0.75 and 1 depending on when the individual claims benets, and how many
months he or she earns above the Earnings Test after claiming benets.
18 Six percent of the 153 million workers with Social Security taxable earnings in 2002 had earnings at or above
the maximum amount.
27immediately prior to the NRA. The reduction of benets is 5/12 of 1 percent for every month
before that. Thus, the maximum actuarial reduction will reach 30 percent as the NRA increases to
67 over the next few years (see SSA-S 2005, p.18).19
Actuarial Reduction Factor
One less-emphasized feature of the process of benet reduction due to early retirement is the
possibility to reduce the penalty even after initiating the receipt of benets. The specics of this
adjustment to the Actuarial Reduction Factor are documented in the Social Security Handbook
(SSA-H, §724. Basic reduction formulas, §728. Adjustment of reduction factor at FRA) and in
the internal operating manual used by Social Security eld employees when processing claims for
Social Security benets (SSA-M, RS00615. Computation of Monthly Benets Amounts) but may
not be well-understood by the retirees.20 To illustrate this feature of the system, suppose the NRA
is 66 years, and an individual claims benets at age 62 and n months, where n
;
<
; 48, receives
checks for x months where
￿
n
￿ x
;
=
; 48
￿ , and suspends receiving checks after that until she turns
66 (after which she retires for good). In this case she receives x checks of
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It is important to note that the adjustment of the ARF is automatic and becomes effective only after
reaching the NRA.
Earnings Test
The Earnings Test limit denes the maximum amount of income from work that a beneciary
who claims benets before the NRA under OASI may earn while still receiving the full MBA.21
19 The reductions in benets for early claimers are designed to be approximately actuarially fair for the average
individual. During the post-NRA period additional adjustments exist: Workers claiming benets after the NRA earn
the delayed retirement credit (DRC). For those born in 1943 or later it is 2/3 of 1 percent for each month up to age 70
which is considered actuarially fair. For those born before 1943 it ranges from 11/24 to 5/8 of 1 percent per month,
depending on their birth year.
20 The Social Security Administration does not use the term Actuarial Reduction Factor in their publications, but a
number of the people we have talked to within the administration do use this terminology. In publications the related
concept of Reduction Factor(s) (RF) which is simply the number of months in which benets were received before
the NRA is used. The RF maps into a Fraction that ranges between0.75and 1 (for an ERA of 62 andan NRA of 66).
The latter corresponds to what we refer to as ARF. The ARF (Fraction) is adjusted upwards at the NRA according
to the number of months before the NRA in which benets were withheld.
21 Some sources of income do not count under the Earnings Test. For details see SSA-H §1812. Notice that
retirement contributions by the employer do not count towards the limit, but additional contributions by the employee
even if they are through a payroll deduction are counted. This means that individuals earning above the limit cannot
just increase their retirement savings to avoid being subject to the limit. We thank Barbara Lingg and Christine Vance
from the Social Security Administration for clarifying this point, which is rarely discussed in any publication.
28Earnings above the limit are taxed at a rate of 50 percent for beneciaries between age 62 and the
January of the year in which they reach the NRA, and 33 percent from January of that year until the
month they reach the NRA (SSA-S 2005, p.19; SSA-S 2005, Table 2.A18). For the latter period,
the earnings limit is higher, $31,800, compared with $12,000 for the earlier period as of 2005
(SSA-S 2005, Table 2.A29). Starting in 2000, the Earnings Test was eliminated for individuals
over the NRA.
Individuals who continue or reenter employment after claiming Social Security benets before
the NRA, and whose earning power or hours constraints are such that their income from work is
around or below the earnings limit, are mailed their full monthly check from Social Security and
are locked-in at the reduced benet rate permanently. Those with earnings above the limit will not
receive checks from Social Security for some months and thereby adjust their ARF.22 Individuals
have the option of informing Social Security to suspend the monthly benet payment at any time if
they believe they will be making earnings high enough above the Earnings Test. However, during
the rst year after claiming benets, the Social Security Administration performs a monthly test to
determine whether the person should receive the monthly check. As a result an early claimer who
is not working or earns below the limit in the months after claiming (grace year) will receive
all monthly benets even if earnings for that calendar year exceed the Earnings Test limit due to
high earnings before claiming.23 After the rst year, the test is typically yearly and it depends on
the expected earnings of the individual. Given the scarce documentation of the functioning of the
ARF, having earned above the earnings limit, and thus receiving fewer checks, may be a common
way for beneciaries to learn about the possibility of undoing the early retirement penalty.24
22 A beneciary may receive a partial monthly benet at the end of the tax year if there are excess earnings that do
not completely offset the monthly benet amount (see SSA-H, §1806).
23 Social Security claim specialists emphasized to us that during the rst year after claiming they do what is most
advantageous to the claimer, the monthly or the yearly test, if they have enough information. However, they failed
to clarify what that means. Some of them said the number of checks individuals receive is maximized, but we were
unable to nd documentationof such practices. In any case, the internal operating instructions used by Social Security
eld employees when processing claims for Social Security benets state that the monthly Earnings Test only applies
for the calendar year when benets are initiated unless the type of benet changes (see SSA-M, RS02501.030).
24 See Ben´ tez-Silva and Heiland (2006) for a numeric example of the streams of income resulting from these
incentives.
29Table 1: Social Security Claiming Behavior, 1994-2005. Proportions by age of rst receipt.
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997a 1998a 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Age 62 0.5886 0.5825 0.6008 0.5968 0.5833 0.5858 0.5171 0.5539 0.5602 0.5699 0.5753 0.5663
Age 63 0.0789 0.0787 0.0746 0.0735 0.0801 0.0798 0.0671 0.0779 0.0777 0.0782 0.0810 0.0830
Age 64 0.1212 0.1160 0.1080 0.1046 0.1077 0.1077 0.1045 0.1344 0.1484 0.1273 0.1094 0.0992
Age 65 0.1566 0.1629 0.1568 0.1551 0.1557 0.1557 0.1959 0.1785 0.1724 0.1784 0.1862 0.1974
Age 66 0.0182 0.0178 0.0199 0.0210 0.0210 0.0194 0.0392 0.0130 0.0096 0.0105 0.0122 0.0146
Age 67-69 0.023 0.0245 0.0256 0.0339 0.0286 0.0291 0.0550 0.0199 0.0152 0.0160 0.0177 0.0187
Age 70+ 0.0128 0.0171 0.0140 0.0147 0.0232 0.0221 0.0208 0.0221 0.0161 0.0193 0.0178 0.0204
# of Claimantsb 1,444.5 1,424.8 1,396.1 1,418.9 1,441.3 1,484.6 1,758.9 1,574.0 1,595.5 1,593.3 1,680.3 1,793.5
Notes: a The percentages do not coincide with those reported in the Statistical Supplements since we have not counted the 120,000 widows
who were converted in these years from widow benets to retirement benets. b In thousands of claimers. Does not include disability
conversions at the NRA.
3
0Table 2: Social Security beneciaries' monthly benets by age, 1994-2005. In Dollars of 2005.
Age/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Age 62 788.58 789.53 785.31 802.01 815.35 855.64 864.56 884.42 892.58 900.40 888.31 881.9
Age 63 882.14 906.02 942.89 881.71 907.85 928.79 960.51 973.08 1,002.77 1,006.43 996.66 986.9
Age 64 981.51 982.52 997.16 1,014.71 1,001.66 987.87 1,020.39 1,072.88 1,119.80 1,119.68 1,102.01 1,089.8
Age 65 1,083.9 1,091.07 1,087.78 1,117.29 1,088.05 1,100.29 1,184.50 1,176.10 1,239.22 1,257.03 1,270.85 1,298.3
Age 66 1,022.36 1,077.35 1,033.01 1,049.14 1,030.42 1,093.73 1,247.67 939.56 881.73 919.08 981.26 1,052.2
Age 67 1,027.76 1,138.1 1,071.35 988.67 1,050.19 1,128.66 1,285.78 911.44 873.48 877.89 933.59 1,010.4
3
1Table 3: Simulation Results: 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic Model
Ages Survivors Full-Timea Part-Timea No Worka Claimersb Benets in $
Model 1: Earnings Test as a Tax
Age 60 8,234 5,749 (69.8%) 163 (5.7%) 2,322 (28.8%)  
Age 61 8,078 5,635 (69.7%) 213 (2.6%) 2,230 (27.6%)  
Age 62 7,951 4,714 (59.2%) 2 (0.02%) 3,235 (40.6%) 2,672 (34.9%) 1,042
Age 63 7,762 2,013 (25.9%) 856 (11.0%) 4,893 (63.0%) 1,331 (17.4%) 1,151
Age 64 7,586 495 (6.5%) 2,008 (26.4%) 5,083 (67.0%) 1,048 (13.7%) 1,272
Age 65 7,420 113 (1.5%) 2,731 (36.8%) 4,576 (61.6%) 1,362 (17.8%) 1,391
Age 66 7,239 414 (5.7%) 3,484 (48.1%) 3,341 (46.1%) 847 (11.0%) 1,500
Model 2: Earnings Test with ARF Adjustments
Age 60 8,234 5,749 (69.8%) 154 (1.8%) 2,331 (28.3%)  
Age 61 8,078 5,636 (69.7%) 214 (2.6%) 2,228 (27.5%)  
Age 62 7,951 4,058 (51.0%) 0 3,893 (49.0%) 3,741 (48.3%) 981
Age 63 7,762 1,657 (21.3%) 1,387 (17.8%) 4,718 (60.7%) 1,073 (13.8%) 1,155
Age 64 7,586 434 (5.7%) 2,413 (31.8%) 4,739 (62.5%) 815 (10.5%) 1,277
Age 65 7,420 175 (2.4%) 3,139 (42.3%) 4,106 (55.3%) 1,808 (23.3%) 1,390
Age 66 7,239 553 (7.6%) 4,179 (57.7%) 2,507 (34.6%) 306 (4.1%) 1,480
Model 3: ET with ARF Adjustments and Social Security Reform Uncertainty
Age 60 8,234 5,768 (70.05%) 118 (1.43%) 2,348 (28.5%)  
Age 61 8,078 5,636 (69.8%) 177 (2.2%) 2,265 (28.04%)  
Age 62 7,951 3,377 (42.5%) 0 (0.00%) 4,574 (57.5%) 4,603 (59.08%) 997
Age 63 7,762 1,540 (19.9%) 2,000 (25.8%) 4,222 (54.4%) 813 (10.4%) 1,180
Age 64 7,586 394 (5.2%) 2,802 (36.93%) 4,390 (57.9%) 689 (8.8%) 1,275
Age 65 7,420 181 (2.4%) 3,511 (47.3%) 3,728 (50.2%) 1,659 (21.3%) 1,390
Age 66 7,239 594 (8.2%) 4,351 (60.1%) 2,294 (31.2%) 27 (0.4%) 1,514
Notes: aIn numbers, and as percentage of survivors. bNumber of First Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed.
32Table 4: Policy Experiment: NRA is now 67. 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic Model
Ages Survivors Full-Timea Part-Timea No Worka Claimersb Benets in $
Model 1: Earnings Test as a Tax, and NRA=67
Age 60 8,234 5,771 (70.1%) 117 (1.4%) 2,346 (28.5%)  
Age 61 8,078 5,640 (69.8%) 166 (2.1%) 2,272 (28.1%)  
Age 62 7,951 5,530 (69.5%) 0 2,423 (30.5%) 1,872 (24.8%) 989
Age 63 7,762 4,237 (54.6%) 194 (2.5%) 3,331 (42.9%) 446 (5.9%) 1,110
Age 64 7,586 1,744 (22.9%) 514 (6.7%) 5,328 (70.2%) 1,040 (13.78%) 1,212
Age 65 7,420 1,124 (15.1%) 0 6,298 (84.8%) 1,884 (24.9%) 1,234
Age 66 7,239 848 (11.7%) 0 6,393 (88.3%) 1,862 (24.6%) 1,392
Age 67 7,041 1,078 (15.3%) 0 5,968 (84.7%) 412 (5.46%) 1,457
Model 2: Earnings Test with ARF Adjustments, and NRA=67
Age 60 8,234 5,773 (70.1%) 123 (1.5%) 2,338 (28.4%)  
Age 61 8,078 5,636 (69.7%) 173 (2.1%) 2,269 (28.1%)  
Age 62 7,951 4,150 (52.1%) 3 (0.03%) 3,798 (47.8%) 4,016 (51.96%) 886
Age 63 7,762 2,173 (27.99%) 1,409 (18.1%) 4,180 (53.85%) 996 (12.88%) 1,049
Age 64 7,586 839 (11.1%) 2,400 (31.6%) 4,347 (57.3%) 605 (7.8%) 1,182
Age 65 7,420 309 (4.16%) 3,024 (40.7%) 4,087 (55.1%) 738 (9.55%) 1,259
Age 66 7,239 158 (2.2%) 3,670 (50.69%) 3,411 (47.1%) 1,302 (16.84%) 1,397
Age 67 7,041 466 (6.6%) 4,314 (61.3%) 2,261 (32.1%) 71 (0.91%) 1,516
Model 3: ET with ARF Adjustments, Social Security Reform Uncertainty, and NRA=67
Age 60 8,234 5,765 (70.01%) 118 (1.43%) 2,347 (28.5%)  
Age 61 8,078 5,634 (69.75%) 177 (2.2%) 2,267 (28.06%)  
Age 62 7,951 3,371 (42.4%) 0 (0.00%) 4,578 (57.57%) 5,084 (65.16%) 1,060
Age 63 7,762 2,016 (25.97%) 2,000 (25.8%) 3,597 (46.3%) 714 (9.15%) 1,073
Age 64 7,586 769 (10.1%) 2,802 (36.93%) 3,883 (51.1%) 512 (6.56%) 1,191
Age 65 7,420 316 (4.2%) 3,511 (47.3%) 3,552 (47.9%) 927 (11.9%) 1,281
Age 66 7,239 158 (2.2%) 4,392 (60.6%) 2,736 (37.8%) 561 (7.2%) 1,398
Age 67 7,041 499 (7.1%) 4,392 (60.6%) 2,217 (31.5%) 4 (0.05%) 1,523
Notes: aIn numbers, and as percentage of survivors. bNumber of First Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed.
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